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UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS IN RELATION
TO AMERICAN BUSINESSES OPERATING
IN THE COMMON MARKET
ALLISON L. ScAfinzi*
In recent years as American business activity abroad has bur-
geoned, there has been rising concern over the impact, on business
activity and on foreign relations, of extraterritorial enforcement of
United States antitrust laws. The problem has been most acute for
American businessmen in regard to the multi-national company, i.e.,
the American parent company and alien subsidiary; and, for foreign
relations, in regard to two or more corporations, one American and
the other foreign. Adding now to the complexity of risks facing the
American company that seeks, broadly, to do business in Europe,
is the inherent threat of the strong antitrust provisions of the
Treaty of Rome, the Convention which underlies the European Eco-
nomic Community. Seemingly the American company now faces
assault from three intermingled fronts: American antitrust laws;
antitrust laws of individual European States; and, antitrust laws of
the European Economic Community. The scope of the instant article
is, primarily, to explore the impact of the United States antitrust laws
on the beleaguered American businessman who, for motives of profit
or national purpose, seeks to press his economic frontiers to the Con-
tinent.
RELEVANT DEFINITION OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY
It would be judicious, at the outset, to define extraterritoriality
as it is generally understood in international law. Briefly has given
it quite a limited definition, i.e., that it relates merely to the lack of
or limiting of jurisdiction over persons physically present in State
A.1 Most other authorities, such as Stumberg, dichotomize the term,
stating that extraterritoriality relates either (a) to whether or not
the laws of State A have operative effect in State B so as to be enforce-
able by courts in State B; or (b) to the extent to which laws in State
* A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the University of Michigan (1951 and 1954 re-
spectively) ; graduate studies in international affairs at the Fletcher School of Law &
Diplomacy and Harvard Law School, 1954-55. Member of Michigan, American and
Detroit Bar Associations, American Society of International Law, American Institute of
Aeronautics and Astronautics, Michigan Aeronautics and Space Association; member of
International and Comparative Law Section of ABA, and International and Compara-
tive Law Committees of the State Bar of Michigan and Detroit Bar Association; Chair-
man, Special Committee on Space Law, State Bar of Michigan; presently in private
practice in Detroit.
1 Brierly, The Law of Nations 222 (6th ed. 1963).
561
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
A operate with respect to events occurring in State B so as to be
enforceable by courts in State A.'
Extraterritoriality, as defined by Brierly, relates merely to the
generally understood exclusions of nationals of State B, in State A,
from the jurisdiction of State A. Examples of this cover situations
such as the right of innocent passage of State B ships through the
waters of State A and the immunity of State B diplomats from State
A laws. Clearly this is not the area of instant concern.
Stumberg's section (a) definition can be similarly dismissed. It
relates to such ordinary conflict of laws questions as whether State
A's laws can control a contract made between State A and B parties
where a party seeks to enforce the contract in the courts of State B.
It is Stumberg's section (b) definition of extraterritoriality that
concerns us here. The ultimate question then becomes: does State A's
right to enforce its laws stop at the water's edge?
THE SCOPE OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
Even the most ardent defenders of the right of the United States
to enforce its antitrust Jaws extraterritorially, most notably Wilbur L.
Fugate, admit the general international law rule to be that States are
limited in their jurisdiction to activities occurring within their physical
borders.' Yet, the most ardent critics of those who zealously insinuate
United States antitrust laws into transactions taking place at the
ends of the earth (and will presumably attempt to enforce these good
laws in outer space) must admit that the general rule has always
allowed for exceptions where acts take place in more than one State.'
Otherwise many multi-state transactions could be deemed incapable
of regulation by any State.
Pursuing this rationale, Fugate quotes a statement from the Alcoce
decision that is extremely relevant: (a) because it seems to state the
generally understood rule of international law; and, (b) more im-
portant, because it states the unswerving United States policy, i.e.,
"any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within
its borders which the state reprehends."°
For those vitally interested for present business purposes in what
2 Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 52 n.5 (3d ed. 1963).
3 Fugate, Enforcement of the United States Antitrust Laws in Foreign Trade,
A.B.A. Bull., Section of Intl & Comp. L., Dec. 1960, p. 20, at 23. (Cited hereinafter as
"Fugate") ; cf. Preliminary Report, Association of the Bar of New York, National
Security and Foreign Policy in the Application of the American Antitrust Laws to
Commerce with Foreign Nations 8, 9 (1957).
4 Fugate, supra note 3, at 23.
5 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
6 Id. at 443. Cited by Fugate, supra note 3, at 23.
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the policy is, rather than in speculation as to what it ought to be,
Fugate casts the spotlight upon an unequivocal excerpt from the 1958
draft of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe rules attaching legal
consequences to conduct, including rules_relating to property,
status or other interests with respect to conduct occurring:
(a) In its territory;
(b) Partly within and partly outside its territory;
(c) Entirely outside its territory if the conduct has, or
is intended to have, effects within its territory
which have a reasonably close relationship to the
conduct.'
Directing our attention to (b) and (c), it would be pertinent to
know what type of off-shore conduct might reasonably be concluded
to have a detrimental effect within the United States, in terms of
United States antitrust laws.
OFFSHORE IMPACT ON DOMESTIC COMMERCE
Ever since the era of Senator Sherman and President Theodore
Roosevelt, free competition has been a public policy corollary to free
enterprise in the United States. Combinations in restraint of trade
have been deemed evils of the market place aimed at the strangulation
of the incipient competitor, and the small competitor not desirous, or
incapable, of vying for impregnable bigness. Fugate ably traces the
thread of this policy into the international business realm: 8 (1) the
Sherman Act, he reminds us, specifically states that monopolization
of commerce between the United States and foreign nations is pro-
hibited; (2) sponsors of the Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act in
1918 purposely made clear that its intended exceptions to the Sherman
Act were narrow and in no way indicative of lukewarm support of
United States antitrust laws relative to foreign commerce; and, (3)
a standard Mutual Security Act provision states that Congress is
cognizant of "the vital role of free enterprise in achieving rising levels
of production essential to the economic progress and defensive strength
of the free world," but that our policy is "to foster private initiative
and competition" and "to discourage monopolistic practices" in in-
ternational trade.9
7 ALI Restatement, Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 8 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, May 1958).
8 Fugate, supra note 3, at 20-27.
9 Id. at 21.
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Many landmark decisions lay down the general guidelines of off-
shore private economic conduct construed to have a substantial impact
upon domestic American commerce not consonant with the antitrust
policy of the United States. In the American Tobacco" case, for
example, the Supreme Court held illegal a London contract between
the American Tobacco Company and the Imperial Tobacco Company
of Great Britain whereby the parties agreed to divide the world to-
bacco market; and, in the Imperial Chemical Industries" case, the
district court required that either I.C.I. or DuPont divest itself of
interest in jointly-owned foreign subsidiaries, claiming that the patent
and processes agreements which formed the basis for these ventures
were in furtherance of conspiracies to effect territorial division of
markets. There are many examples, but only one point, i.e., that the
impact upon American trade will be the primary test; and that one will
not be permitted to do indirectly what he is prohibited from doing
directly.
CRITICISM OF EXTRATERRITORIAL ENFORCEMENT
There are many critics of the United States attempts at extra-
territorial enforcement of its antitrust laws. Among the most articulate
is Sigmund Timberg. He catalogues many complaints which point
to the conclusions that the United States policy is: (1) undermining
its relationships with friendly States; and, (2) interfering with sound
international economic relations." He notes that the Netherlands
has been so displeased at involvement of its nationals in the General
Electric Lampn and Canadian Electronic Patents" cases that a
provision was included in its Economic Competition Law of 1956
whereby compliance with antitrust regulations of another State with-
out prior consent of Netherlands authorities is prohibited." There
is an indignant Ontario statute making it a crime to send corporate
records out of Canada at the request of a foreign governmental au-
thority." Many other foreign complaints and criticisms are extant
but the most cogent would seem to be contained in the Canadian
government's complaint arising out of the Canadian Electronic Patents
case:
10 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911).
11 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
12 See generally Timberg, Conflict and Growth in the International and Compara-
tive Law of Antitrust, A.B.A. Bull., Section of Int'l & Comp. L., July 1960, p. 20. (Cited
hereinafter as "Timberg.")
13 United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
14
 United States v. General Elec. Co., civ. 140-57, S D,N,Y., complaint filed Nov.
24, 1958.
15 Timberg, supra note 12, at 21.
10 Id. at 22.
564
UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAWS
. . . I do not put the issue upon the restricted and somewhat
inconstant basis of international law. Even were it to turn
out that ... the antitrust cases could be supported upon some
theory or view of public international law, that nevertheless
would not be a practical solution to a practical problem. . . .
These cases involve on the part of the United States more
interference, and apparent assertion of a right to interfere,
in commercial projects in Canada than is fitting or acceptable
between two friendly but independent countries."
The ultimate question, then, should be whether it is reasonable
for the United States to embroil others in its Carrie Nation-type off-
shore antitrust enforcements.
According to Fugate, the Department of Justice has been in-
creasingly sensitive to foreign relations problems inherent in antitrust
cases.'s He states the direct-substantial-impact-upon-United States-
foreign-commerce test to be generally controlling, but makes a policy
statement that should foreclose liberal interpretation of the test by
anyone seeking to advise an international business client: "We in
the Department of Justice believe that our foreign trade cases have
not impinged on the sovereignty of other nations and have been
entirely consistent with the rules of international law and comity." 19
THE COMMON MARKET CONFLICT
Although the impact of Common Market antitrust regulations
on American business activities within the "EEC" is beyond the
scope of this article, it is important to weigh, briefly, certain inherent
conflicts problems. Timberg, for example, points out that any national
legislation weakness of the member countries is likely to be of little
significance if the strong antitrust articles of the Rome Treaty are
strictly construed." No student of United States constitutional law
would assume, certainly, that these provisions will be held to merely
cover trade between Member States, in spite of their language.
Leo M. Drachsler, who has ably addressed himself to the im-
mediate problem of existence of the American parent and alien sub-
sidiary within the Common Market, has delimited these problem
areas : 21
11 Ibid. Statement by E. D. Fulton, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of
Canada explaining his government's objection to the filing of a complaint by the United
States.
12 Fugate, supra note 3, at 25.
19 Id. at 27.
20 Timberg, supra note 12, at 24.
21 Drachsler, American Parent and Alien Subsidiary: International Antitrust Prob-
lems of the Multi-National Corporation, A.B.A. Bull., Section of Int'l & Comp. L., July
1964, p. 29, at 39-41.
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1. The effect of the Common Market "enterprise concept" upon
the American parent. The basic problem will involve the decision of
such organizations whether or not to register their intra-corporate
business agreements with the Common Market. This depends, of
course, on whether or not they are one enterprise. Thereupon, the
spectre of intra-enterprise conspiracy could arise and, since turnabout
must be fair play, the result could be assumption by the Common
Market of antitrust jurisdiction over the American parent.
2. The question of whether or not the American parent would
have the right to receive a hearing before the Common Market Com-
mission. Presumably, the general international law principle relating
to "minimum standards of justice" would protect the American parent
at some administrative or judicial level, but would not necessarily
forestall harassment.
3. The overriding question of potential liability of the American
parent to suit by the Commission. If the Commission concludes that
the parent and subsidiary are one enterprise they could presumably as-
sume in personam jurisdiction over the parent through good notice to
the subsidiary; and, pursuant to its investigatory powers, the Com-
mission could compel the American parent to produce its documents
and records.
The conflict of laws problems, complicated by the extraterritorial
antitrust precedents of the courts of the United States, bode evil for
the American businessman in his European business activities.
PROPOSED RELIEF
Drachsler suggests that one answer to the seemingly insur-
mountable conflict of laws problems, as between the United States
and the Common Market, might be replacement of the conventional
parent-subsidiary form of international operation with a mutually
acceptable denationalized modification.22
 The proposal is vague; and
the method of implementing some form of the proposal from the
United States side would not seem to be an easy task.
Timberg views the conflicts morass with mild hope, putting
forward three possible solutions: 23
1. That the United States courts relax the rigid canons of
American antitrust Jaws to take into account differing foreign policies.
If this could be done, there would be no problems; however, it does not
seem presently feasible.
2. That treaties and bi-governmental consultations be con-
cluded prior to institution of proceedings. Presumably, in view of
dreary precedents, this is not a meaningful answer. Treaties, e.g., the
22 Id. at 41-51.
23 Timberg, supra note 12, at 26-27.
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Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan, did not
forestall the Justice Department when it wished to call a transaction
into question.
3. That multi-national conventions be concluded, as in the case
of the Berne Union which modified certain patent forfeiture sanctions
under national patent laws against foreigners. The difficulty here is
implied in the very term "convention," which is an agreement between
several States.
CONCLUSION
United States and foreign businessmen must, in view of the
antitrust conflicts tangle they face, conduct themselves inter se in a
manner more conservative than is normally conducive to ordinary
and reasonable enterprise success. Otherwise, they face the pos-
sibility of purely national, as well as Common Market, judicial and
administrative handling of their alleged antitrust transgressions on an
ad hoc basis.
American foreign policy in the mid-twentieth century is ostensibly
keyed to the preservation of an economically healthy community of
States with like ideological bases; American domestic policy, likewise,
must of necessity be concerned with the balance of payments and gold
drain problem. Therefore, it is not beyond the realm of reason to
expect that United States policy with respect to extraterritorial en-
forcement of its antitrust laws will be tempered to forward these other,
overriding, policies. Law, in the United States, must follow morality,
but should not be permitted to carry us to tragic error.
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